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The purpose of this paper is to identify conditions under which hedonic price indexes
provide an exact measure of consumer welfare, so that the welfare effects of quality change can
be inferred. Our results are quite positive in providing a rational for existing practices, though
the conditions needed to justify these practices are somewhat restrictive. An application of our
results is provided to the increase in characteristics of Japanese autos sold in the United States
following the imposition of quotas in 1981. We argue that consumers did notvaluethe
additional characteristics at their former shadow-values, but rather, attached a lower value to the
increase in characteristics. We compute the exact index that reflects this lower imputed value,
and compare it to the conventional quality adjustment. The deadweight loss associated with the







In many situations, public policy affects the quality or characteristics of
products. Examples include pollution abatement regulations in autos (Bresnahan
and Yao, 1 955) and other industries: health and safety requirements; and
international trade policies such as quotas, as we shall examine. In these
contexts, it is important to measure the impact of the quality change on social
welfare, as part of a broader cost-benefit analysis.
Onemethod that is often used to measure the quality change is hedonic
regressions,and the associated hedonic price indexes.1There is somed:fficulty.
however, in inferring welfare effects from these methods. While the model of
Rosen (1974) is often used to justify the relation between market prices and the
characteristics of goods, it is not obvious what this market relation implies
about consumers welfare from purchasing goods embodying the characteristics.
Thus, Triplett (1987. 1990) refers to the existing practice of hedonic price
indexes as an 'approximation to the true measure of consumer welfare. A
similar view is expressed by Griliches (1990. p. 189):
What is being estimated [by the hedonic regression] is actually the locus
ofintersections of the demand curves of different consumers with varying
tastes and the supply functions of different firms with possibly varying
technologies of production. one is unlikely, therefore,to recover the
underlyingutility and cost functions from such data alone, except isvery
specialcircumstances.
The interpretation of hedonic methods is even more difficult in the (realistic)
situation where there are only a discrete number of goods, so that consumers are
not optimizing in a marginal fashion over their choice of characteristics. In
that case, firms will be selecting the characteristics bundle of each good.
11Recent applications to various durable goods are described in Gordon (1990).The purpose of this paper is to identify circumstances under which hedonic
price indexes do provide an exact measure of consumer welfare, so that the
welfare effects of quality change can be inferred. We shall deal with both the
cases where consumers optimize over a continuum of goods, and where firms
choose characteristics with only a discrete number of goods. While our results
are quite positive in providing a rational for existing practices, the conditions
needed to justify these practices are somewhat restrictive. In this sense, our
results also indicate the need for further research to enlarge the applicable
range of hedonic methods.
We begin in section 2 with the case where consumers can choose any
characteristics subject to a hedonic budget constraint. We allow for changes in
the hedonic budget constraint over time, and across different varieties of the
good. Assuming that the expenditure function defined over services ofthegood
permitsan exact price index tobe evaluated, then we show how to construct the
exactindex using observed data on prices, quantities and characteristics. This
result is a natural analog to the usual construction of an exact price index over
prices ofgoods, and justifies what Triplett (1990, p. 39)refers to as an
explicitquality adjustment in the price index.
In section 3. we suppose that the characteristics of a discrete number of
productsare chosen by firms. Subject to the special form of the utility
functionwe assume, firms will choose the socially optimal level of characteris-
tics, as in Swan (1970). This will imply that the basic result concerning the
constructionof the exact hedonic price index still applies. Our results do not
extend as stated to more general utility functions, however, such as those
considered by Spence (1975).
An application of our results is provided in sections 4, where we discuss
the increase in characteristics of Japanese autos sold in the United States
2following the imposition of quotas in 1981. This quality-upgrading has been
earlier measured by Feenstra (1988). using conventional hedonic techniques.
From the results in this paper, it can be argued that consumers did not value the
additional characteristics at their former shadow—values, but rather, attached a
lower value to the increase in characteristics. We therefore compute the exact
index that reflects this lower imputed value, and compare it to the conventional
quality adjustment. We are also able to attribute a deadweight loss to the
quality-upgrading that occurred, and this loss is between one-quarter and one-
third of the value of the upgrading.
2.CONSUMER CHOICE OF CHARACTERISTICS
Suppose that the product in question can be fully described by j1
characteristics, and that i1N varieties of the product are available, where
the characteristics vector of variety i in year t is denoted by zt C R. We will
assume that the preferences of all consumers over these varieties can be
represented by the aggregate utility function
U[f1 (z1 t)Xi tfN(zNf)xNtl, (1)
where fi(ztt) denotes the services received from one unit of consumption of
variety i, and x1 denotes the quantity consumed of variety i, in year t.
Both the existence of an aggregate utility function, and its special
functional form in (1). are extremely important to our analysis. A measure of
aggregate utility is usually assumed when trying to justify an exact price index,
since the index is designed to accurately reflect changes in overall consumer
welfare. The existence of aggregate demand functions in a characteristics
framework has been investigated by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989. 1992).
though these results do not immediately justify (1) for two reasons. First.
3these authors are primarily concerned with aggregate demand rather than utilitg,
and the relation between these is not immediate.2 Second, the results of these
authors are obtained by assuming that the characteristics vector of each variety
is fixed. In contrast, we shall be letting the characteristics Zit vary, and it is
unclear whether their demand results can be extended to that case.
Concerning the functional form of (1). we are assuming that the services
received from all consumption of variety i are given by the weakly separable
form f(zt)xt. rather than the more general form Vsi(zit,xit).In other words,
each unit consumed yields the same services of fi(zit). This is very similar to
Fisher and Shell's (1 g72) notion of repackaging, where the scalar qualitg of
each good multiplies the quantity in the utility function. A good example is
when the services received from a good depend on its durability, which
multiplies the stock to obtain the service flow. In an intertemporal framework,
Swan (I 970) establishes the social optimality of the monopoly (or competitive)
choice of durability.3 This result will carry over to the utility function (1).
where we shall demonstrate the optimality of the monopolistically competitive
choice of characteristics (see section 3). This keg result certainly depends on
the weak separability assumed: Spence (1 975) considers more general utility
functions like *i(zit,xit). and argues that the monopoly (or competitive) choice
of quality are not optimal. In that case the results in this paper will not
follow as stated, as discussed further in the concluding section.
We suppose that the price of variety i is given by a Thedonic functton,
Pithit(zit), (2)
2 Jorgenson (1990) describes an approach to integrating aggregate demand
functions and social welfare in the absence of characteristics.
Abel (1983) investigates the general validity of Swan's result when marginal
costs of the firm are not constant.
4where the consumers are allowed to choose the characteristics Zit. Thus, we
have in mind a situation where the characteristics of each variety can be
specified by consumers prior to purchase, and the hedonic functions may change
over time. Any product for which consumers can specify the characteristics
would serve as an example. We assume that the utility function (1) is
maximized over the choice of x U and z1, subject to the budget constraint
N
h(z1)x . Et. (3)
where Et is total expenditure on the good in year t.While the first-order
conditions for this problem are readily computed, to characterize the second-
order conditions it will be useful to rewrite the maximization slightly.
Let Eu denote the expenditure on variety i in year t, so that the quantity
purchased must be xit Eut/put Eit/ht(zjt). Substituting this into (1), the





It is immediate that maximizing (4a) implies maximizing fi(zi t )/hu t(zi t). which
is interpreted as the services provided per dollar of expenditure on variety i.
The first-order condition for this sub-problem Is:
ar(zut) Iahit(zit)
fiazuthitaz1t
This condition states that there is equality between the relative marginal costand marginal benefit of adding each characteristic: increasing a characteristic
must lead to the same percentage increase in costs and benefits at the optimum.
A sufficient condition for the point Zit satisfying (5) to be a global maximum of
f(zit)/hit(zit)is that this ratio is quasi-concave in Zit, whichholds if and only
if [lnf(zt)-lnht(zit)]is quasi—concave. Thus, to ensure that this second-order
conditionis satisfied, we will make the stronger assumption:4
Assumstion 1
The function lnfl(zlt) is concave and lnhlt(zlt) is convex in Zit.i'l N.
We will also want to add a second assumption, related to the existence of
an exact price index: the results in this paper will then show how to measure
the index. To this end, define Wit fi(zi t)xi as the total consumption services
from variety i, and qit Epit/fi(zit) as the price per unit of services. Note that
these magnitudes are not be observed by the researcher, since fi(zit) is unknown.
The utility function (1) is U(yt), which we assume is homothetic in y by choice
of units for utility, it is also taken to be homogeneous of degree one. Then the
dual expenditure function E(q.U) can be written as E(q,Ut) r e(q)U, where
e(q) is the unit-expenditure function. Diewert (1976) defines a price index to
be exact if it equals the ratio e(q)/e(q_ ). which can be interpreted as the
change in the cost of living between two periods. Our next assumption will be
that such an exact price index exists. To state this formally, assume that the
consumption vector y maximizes utility for the services-prices qt, and the
budget constraint qy S E5, for nt-it, and let sit :pitxit/Et denote the
budget share on variety i.
4The other second-order condition for problem (4) is that U is quasi-concave.
6Assumption 2
LettingQt(q11/q11_1 denote the vector of service-price ratios,
thereexists aprice index P(Qt,st-i.st) such that
with8P/Qt>O.
Diewert (1976) demonstratesthe existence of anexact index for a wide
class of unit-expenditures functions called quadratic means of order r, which
include the quadratic, translog, constant elasticity of substitution (CES). and a
number of other common functional forms. The formula for the exact price
index depends on the price ratios and expenditure shares i each period, and
satisfies the condition that an increase in the price ratio for any good increases
the index, as stated in Assumption 2.
Since the service prices q are not observed by the researcher, the index
number P(Ot,sti si) cannot be directly measured. We shall assume, however,
that information about the consumers' budget constraint (2) is available. While
the entire hedonic function h11(z11) may not be observed, we can expect that
these functions are known at least in a neighborhood of the characteristics Zit
chosen by the consumers, satisfying (5). We state this requirement as:
Assumotion 3
The hedonic prices it alnh1(z11)/az11 are observed, where zit satisfies (5).
Using these hedonic prices along with condition (5), and the concavity of
lnfi(zit) from Assumption 1, we obtain the bounds:
jt(zit—zit_i) ., lnf(zt)— lnfi(zit_i) .. t_i(zjt—zit_i). (5)
Inverting this expression, taking the exponent, and multiplying by the price ratio
(Pit/Pit-i) we obtain:Pit Pit . 0it (7)
where we haved used the service—prices qE pit/fi(ztt), and the price ratios Qit
defined in Assumption 2. Then using aP/aotao in Assumption 2, we obtain:
Proposition I
Under Assumptions 1—3, the exact index P(Qt,sti .st) satisfies:
P(t—i Ot.st—i •st) s P(Qt.st—i .t) < P(t Ôt,st—i .t), (6)
whereOt(Pit/Pit-i )exp[—$jt(zit—ziti )], for t r t-i ,t.
This result provides bounds on the exact index P(Qt.ti.st), where these
bounds can be measured with the observed prices, market shares, and the hedonic
prices it Notice that the service-price ratios Ô used in the bounds are
obtained by multiplying (Pit'Pit-l ) by the term exp[-t(zit-ziti )), which
corresponds to the explicit quality adjustmentS described by Triplett (1990, P.
39). This adjustment is made using the period t- I hedonic prices Tht-in the
lower—bound, and period t values it in the upper-bound. In practice, if these
hedonic prices are constant (or changing insignificantly) over time, then the
lower and upper—bounds in part (a) are identical, and a unique measure of the
price index is obtained.
An extension of this result can be obtained under the assumption the
lnf(zt) is quadratic, so that the inequalities in (6) can be stated as:
lnf(zt) - lnf(zti) r (flt-i 4$it)'(zit-ziti), (6)
due to the quadratic approximation lemma (Diewert, 1976).It follows that
8Ot[(t- i1)(11)]°.If the exact price index P can be written as a weighted
geometric mean or the price ratios Qit,5 then this index can also be measured as
the geometric mean of the bounds in Proposition 1.
3.FIRM CHOICE OF CHARACTERISTICS
We shall now suppose that the characteristics z of each variety are
treated as exogenous by consumers. Their problem is to simply choose the
optimal quantity it or each variety, or equivalently, the demand for services
f(z1)x1. Let yt D(q1,Et) denote the demand for the services of each
variety. Firms simultaneously choose the characteristics and price of each
variety to maximize profits, under monopolistic competition. Let g1(z) denote
the cost of producing one unit of variety iin yeart.whichisassumedto be
independentof output. We suppose that each variety is produced by only one
firm, though each firm may produce multiple varieties.
Assumethat firms treat the prices and characteristics chosen by other
firms as fixed.If the firm is producing varieties 1M, then the profit-




(pit — gjt(z1f)]xi q1>o,z[tt — f•(Z•) j D(qt,E), (9)
where x on the left of (9) depends on the maximizing variables Pit and Zit,
since x D(qt,Et)/f(zt) and ci1t ptffi(zt). These definitions are used to
obtain the expression on the right, where firms are then maximizing over the
A weighted geometric formula of the type P fl(Qit/Qit-i )Wit applies for the
index number when the unit-expenditure function is translog, CES, and as an
approximation to all the quadratic mean of order r functions (Diewert, 1978).choice of characteristics and service—prices qit.6It is immediate that to
maximize the right of (9), firms must minimize gt(zit)/ft(zit), which is
interpreted as the cost of supplying one unit of consumption services. The





which is analogous to (5). A sufficient condition for the characteristics
satisfying (10) to globally maximize profits is that:7
AssumDtion 1'
The function lnfi(zjt) is concave and lngit(zit) is convex in z, i1 N.
Thus, with firms choosing characteristics to maximize profits, we obtain
an equality between the marginal benefit and marginal cost, as stated in (10).
As noted earlier, this result depends on the special form of the utility function
in (1). We will suppose that the marginal costs are known in a neighborhood of
the equilibrium position:
AssumDtion 3'
The relative marginal cost of characteristics it lng(z1)/àz are observed,
where Zit satisfies (10).
It is then immediate that Proposition 1 still holds:
6 This change in maximizing variables depends on having firms choose prices and
characteristics simultaneously.
7 The other condition needed to ensure that profits are globally maximized in
(13) is that profits are quasi—concave in prices qt. for fixed characteristics.
10Corollaru 1
Under Assumption 1', 2 and 3'. Proposition 1 holds as stated.
This extension of Proposition 1 means that it can be applied even when
there is a discrete number of products, whose basic characteristics cannot be
chosen by consumers. This describes the purchases of automobiles, for example.
and in the next section we shall apply the results of Proposition 1 to Japanese
autos imported to the U.S. These imports have been subject to a voluntary
export restraint (VER) since 1961. and experienced a dramatic increase in their
characteristics under this trade restriction. In the remainder of this section
we reexamine the firm's profit-maximization problem under the VER.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan specifies
the maximum number of autos exported to the U.S. for each firm, on an annual
basis. Denoting this limit by Xt, a firm producing the varieties i:1M solves:
q'O,z1i [nit - Di(qt,Et)at. s, (12)
where it denotes the exports of model i in year t.
Letting Xt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint in (12). the
first-order condition with respect to the characteristics is,
1 afi(zit) 1ôgt(zt)iàzt1 — I
Jflit. (13) Nzit LXt + git(zit)
Thus, in contrast to (1 D), we do notobtainan equality between the firm's
relative marginal cost and consumer's marginal benefit of characteristics. This
equality is broken by the binding VER constraint, and higher values of At will be
1112
associated with an increase in characteristics, when weighted by the initial
marginal benefits alnfi(zit)/ozit;
alnft(zjtYdzit alnft(zt)' [â2lngit(zjt)aslnfi(zit)1 alnfj(zjt)
aztdXt x1ro ôz[ àZj1
-
ôZflj Sz
which is nonnegative from Assumption 1'.Thus, as the VER becomes more
binding, firms choose to upgrade the characteristics.
To interpret condition (13), note that if consumer's laced the budget
constraint ht(zt)Xt + g(zj), and maximized over the choice of characteris-
tics. then condition (13) would follow directly from (5),8 That is. the increase
the price of all varieties by the dollar amount Xt would lower the marginal cost
of any characteristic relative fo the total price of the product (which is
higher). Then at the optimum, consumers would also increase their purchases of
characteristics so as to lower the marginal utility received, relative to total
utility. Thus, quality upgrading is obtained, regardless of whether consumers or
firms choose the characteristics.
Returning to the firm's problem, the other first-order condition for (12)
is obtained by maximizing over q
E [Pit -gjt(zt) - Xt] j -D(q,E). (14)
From this condition, the equilibrium prices can be solved as:9
As we note below, the price paid by consumers actually exceeds i + g(z1)
but we use this example to interpret the results.
To obtain (15) we mate use of the symmetry relation aD/aq aDiaq. which
holds if the number of varieties is large, so that income effects can be ignored.(1 — Jiit)pitXt+ (15)
where: PitE B1 andB denotes the inverse of the matrix of elasticities A,
with elements Au-1—i ¶tc(ôxit p,j ôqt Dit) it x
The expression (1 —Pit)Pit on the left of (15) should be interpreted as a
generalized marginal revenue, which takes into account the effect of one extra
unit of variety i on all the prices j:1H, and thus on total revenueof the
firm.From (15), marginal revenue of each variety exceeds marginal cost by the
multiplier Xt.In our estimation we also assume that this multiplier is the
same across exporting firms.
4.QUALITY-UPGRADING IN JAPANESE AUTOS
Feenstra (1988) estimates of the following regression over 1979-85 for
the base version of all Japanese autos imported to the U.S.:
Pit t • exp(oit + "zit) + Eit, (16)
where the characteristics zit include weight, width, height, horsepower, type of
transmission, and whether the car has power steering or air conditioning as
standard equipment. The coefficients t measure the dollar increase tn the price
of each auto due to the VER constraint, while coefficients t measure the annual
change in prices that would have occurred even in the absence of the VER.10
To make the connection between the hedonic regression (16) and the pricing
relation (15), define PitEpit/(1-pit). so that (1+pit)r(l-pjtY1 is the markup
10 The estimated regression is reported in the Appendix.
13over marginal costs in (15). We will treat Pit as a random variable across




it (Pit — * gt(zt)1. (17c)
Thus,t is an inflated version of the multiplier X1, and should be interpreted as
thequota-premium earnedon each unit sold. Similarly, exp(ot 'Zlt)isan
inflated version of marginal costs, which incorporates the average markup Pt.
Provided that Pt is uncorrelated with the characteristics zit, then the error
term Ejtwillalso be uncorrelated with the characteristics, and we can expect
(16) to provide unbiased estimates of the marginal cost parameters ',1 1
InTable 1,we report the unit—price and price index for the sample of
Japaneseimported autos, and also the unit—quality and quality index, which are
slightly revised from Feenstra (1 988),1 2 Quality for each model is constructed
as the exponential of the linear combination of physical characteristics, using
the coefficients '. These are averaged using the annual sales to obtain unit-
quality, and aggregated using the Fisher—Ideal formula to obtain the quality
index; the same averaging and Fisher—Ideal formula are used to obtain the unit-
price and price index.
It is apparent from a comparison of the price and quality indexes in Table
11Estimating (16) will lead to an upward bias in the marginal cost parameters
if the markups are correlated with the characteristics.In the Appendix we
check for this correlation in the 1 85 gear, using estimates of the markups
from Feenstra and Levinsohn (1991). There is little evidence of bias in the
coefficientsdue to incorporating the markups into the error.
12 The principal changes are that the 1985 sales data were revised, and there is
noimputation for new car models before they actually appear.
141 that increases in the physical characteristics of Japanese imported autos
account for fully one-half of the increase in price over 1980-85: the price index
• increases 49% over this period, while the quality index increases by 25%. The
ratio of these two indexes is also shown in the middle of Table 1 . and this ratio
rises by 18% over 1980-85. While about one-half of the rise in prices is
accounted for by the quality upgrading, it would be incorrect to draw any
inference about the welfare of U.S. consumers from this comparison. The reason
is that the quality index in Table 1 is constructed using constant coefficients'
toevaluate the characteristics, whereas the correct welfare weights itin (13)
arenot constant.





Thus, the consumer valuation of the additional characteristics is less than the
coefficients , by an amount that falls as the quota premium s increases. The
estimates of the quota premium from Feenstra (1988) range from $434 in 1981
toa high of $1,096 in 1984, and the corresponding average value of the fraction
on the right of (18) is 0.93 and 0.86 in these years. Thus, the correct valuation
of the additional characteristicsfluctuates around 90% of the coefficients .
Using (18) to obtain $it. Proposition 1 can be applied as stated to measure
the exact price index for Japanese imported autos. The lower-bound and upper-
bounds for the exact index are shown in Table 1. Comparing these to the
price/quality ratio, we see that the exact index rises more over the period of
the VER, due to the diminishing consumer valuation of the added characteristics.
It is tempting to interpret the difference between the exact index and the
1516
price/qualityratio as a measure of the deadweight loss of the upgrading caused
by the VER, since consumers value the additional characteristics by less than
their budget cost from the hedonic regression. To make the measure of loss
more precise, however, we need to compare the VER to some other trade
instrument that would not cause the upgrading.
Applying an advaloremtariff will not lead to any change in the quality
choiceby firms, since a proportional increase in costs git(zjt) will not affect
the equality of the relative marginal cost and marginal benefit of each
characteristicin (10). Ifatariff of v were applied instead ofthe VER, we
will suppose that prices would equal (1 +tt)jt, where
exp(o4 'ZIo), (1 9)
is a measure of the free-trade prices.In comparison with (16), we are setting
the quota-premium st equal to zero in (19). arid keeping the characteristics of
each model constant at some base level ZQ (which will be their 1980 level).
Forthe purpose of comparing the tariff with the VER, we also ignore the error
term in (16), bysupposing that the markup Pit is constant and equal across all
models.
The losses imposed by the VER and tariff will dependon the magnitude of
each.Rodriguez (1979), Krishna (1987) and Anderson (1988) argue that if the
tariffand quota are set to lead to the same physical quantity ofimports, then
the quota will have a lower deadweight loss. precisely because the upgrading
allows for a higher level of service imports. On the other hand. if the tariff
and quota are designed to lead to the same aggregate price, then it will be
demonstrated below that the deadweight loss of the quota exceeds that of the
tariff. For the purpose of measuring any additional loss due to the upgrading,
thislatter comparison seems most relevant. Thus, letting (1 t)it(1.tt)'it/fi(zt0) denote the service prices under the tariff, we will suppose
that the tariff ti is chosen to satisfy:
e(q)e((l •tt)'t](1 •t)e('t) (20)
where qit pit/fi(zt) are the service prices under the VER. and the final equality
in (20) follows since e(q) is homogeneous of degree one.
The conventional definitions of the deadweight loss under the tariff and
quota are the difference between the total expenditure with and without each
policy, and the revenue or rents generated by it, where all are evaluated at a
constantlevel of utility Ut:
L5 e(q)U -e(t)Ut -salt, (21a)
e[(1.vt)'t)Ut- e('t)Ut - tte('t)Ut. (21b)
Thefinal term in (21b) is the quota rents generated by the VER: since these
accrue to Japanese firms, they must be added onto any measure of the social cost
ofthe quota restriction. The additional toss of the VER due tothe upgrading can
beobtained as the difference between (21a) and (21b):
N N
(L5- L) Ute('t)t-si xi (Pit -st)Xit - Ute('t). (22)
ini1
The first equality of (22) follows directly from (20) and (21).The second
equalityis obtained by noting that total expenditure E1 is equal for the tariff
and quota satisfying (20). so that ipitxit Ut(l.tt)e('t).
Thenext result shows establishes that this additional loss ispositive, and
can be measured with observedprices and quantities:
1718
ProDosition2
The deadweight loss of the quota relative to the price-equivalent tariff 15:
(L5-L) r -1-11
Et r exP(oQ_oo)LPaP j , (23)
where a is a quality-adjusted Paasche index defined as:
N N
PaZpitxit / Pioit exp[3'(zit—zio)) , (24)
in
and P is an exact price index between periods 0 and t.
To prove this result, we use (19) to evaluate the free-trade prices pjand
in the base period 1980. and (16) to evaluate the actual prices.1 Then
(Pit — t) is related to the prices 1980 prices Pie by Pit - st exp(ot + 3"zit)
pixexP(otoo)exP['(2ix2io)]. In addition, the free—trade service prices
it exp(oq+3'zi)/fi(zi) in (22) are related to the 1980 service prices :x bi
'it qi0esp(o(t-o(5). Measuring (22) relative to total expenditure Et Ei P:tXil
ue(qt),we obtain Proposition 2.
This result provides a precise measure of the deadweight less of the auto,
over and above that of the price-equivalent tariff. With the demands x1' in (24)
chosen optimally, the Paasche index will be less than the exact index for two
reasons: those varieties with the greatest increase in service-prices will have
falling demand, and the Paasche index uses the current-period demand it to
evaluate the overall price increase: the service—prices in the denominator of (24)
are constructed using the constant weights , whichexceed thewelfare weights
13 We continue to treat the markups on each variety as equal and constant, so
thatthe error term in (16) is zero.in (18). Thus, the increase in characteristics will lead to a greater rise in
the constructed service-prices, and a smaller increase in the Paasche index.
Note that bothofthese reasons reflect a type of quality-upgrading that occurred
in the Japanese cars: the shift in demand towards more expensive and higher-
quality models can be inferred from the more rapid rise of the unit-price and
unit—quality in Table 1, as compared to the price and quality indexes,
respectively; whereas the increase in characteristics and fall in their welfare
value has been the focus of our discussion throughout this section.1 4
An interpretation of Proposition 2 can be obtained from the familiar case
of taxing two commodities in the absence of any characteristics, as shown in
Figure 1. We assume that the price of good 1 exceeds that of good 2 initially,
with a consumption vector of x0 and utility of U0. Holding expenditure constant
and taxing both commodities at the dollar rate s, will shift the budget line in a
non-parallel manner to A1B1, with consumption at x1 and utility of U1. Quality
upgrading is illustrated by the substitution towards the higher-priced good 1 due
tothis tax.In order to raise the same revenue from an ad valorem taxof t,the
budgetline will instead become A2B2 passing through Xi, but yielding higher
utility of U2 at x2. The deadweightloss orthe dollar tax s -whichis analogous
to the VER -comparedto the ad valorem tax is then U2-U1.
To measure this deadweight loss relative to the initial utility U0, suppose
thatutility is homogeneous ofdegree one in consumption. Then the ratio U,/U0
is measured by an exact quantity index between 00 and x1. Since expenditure is
constant, U1/U0 is equivalently measured by the inverse of an exact price index
between Pa and Pi. Turning to the ratio U2/U0, it is measured by the inverse of
the increase in prices from p to P2 on the budget lines A0B0 and A2B2. relative
14 A simplified version of Proposition 2, that applies when characteristics are
constant and only demand shifts, is obtained by Boorstein and Feenstra (191).20
toany fixed consumption vector. Choosing the reference vector x, we obtain
(pxipx)-1.Sincethe budget lines A1B1 and A282 both pass through
x1, thenpx1px1 by construction. It follows that U2/U5 r (pi /px1 )1, which H
isprecisely the inverse of a Paasche price index between p5 and Pi. Thus, the
deadweight loss (U2 —U1)/U0 is obtained as the difference between the inverse of
the Paasche and exact indexes, as in Proposition 2.15
Near the bottom of Table I we report the quality—adjusted Paasche index,
relative to a 1980 base, calculated as in (24). As expected, this index rises
slower than the bounds for the exact index. The deadweight loss in (23) is
computedusing these indexes, and is obtained as a percent of expenditure on
total imports: the range of estimates obtained using the bounds for the exact
indexare reported at the bottom of Table 1.It can be seen that thedeadweight
lossranges from 4.5 to 6.4 percent of expenditure in 1984-85.
In the final row, the figures in parentheses give the average deadweight
loss expressed as a percentage of the quality upgrading, i.e. expressed relative to
the change in the unit-quality since 1980. For example, the average deadweight
loss of 6.15% in 1985 is $501 per auto, while the upgrading since 1980 is
$1608. so the deadweight loss is 31.2% of the upgrading. Estimates this high
also occur in other years, and except for 1981, the deadweight loss is roughly
between one-quarter and one—third of the value of the upgrading, The large
magnitude of this deadweight loss reflects both the reduced value that
consumers put on the additional characteristics, and the induced substitution
towards higher-priced cars.
As a check on the magnitude of the deadweight loss, we also recomputed
15 The extra term exp(oit-oo) multiplying the loss in (23) reflects the
inflationary rise in free-trade prices over time, and would offset the
corresponding rise in the Paasche and exact price indexes due to inflation.the upper and lower bounds of the exact index using the same set of 1980 models
as used for Paasche index. That is. we excluded the new models that appear in
thesample, and which are incorporated into the exact indexes in Table 2 after
they occur for two years.1 6 The resulting upper and lower bounds for the exact
index are identical to those in Table I for 1 980-83, and take on the slightly
lower values of 4.2-4.9 for 1984. and 5.6-6.1 for 1985. As a result, the
average deadweight loss relative to the quality upgrading is very slightly
smaller at 25.0% in 1984 and 29.7% in 1985. Thus, the appearance of the new
models does not significantly affect our results.
5.CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined the explicit quality adjustment used in
constructing a hedonic price index, and found that this method can be justified on
theoretical grounds. Our assumptions includethe separability of characteristics
andquantities in the underlying utility function, and it is worth emphasizing
that this functional form is quite special. Spence (1975) considers more general
utility functions, and is clearly interested in the welfare Implicatons of the
policies that he discusses. While it is reassuring that the hedonic quality
adjustmentcan be given some justification, further research is needed to
determine whether the separability assumption can be removed.Initial steps
along these lines are contained in the exchange between Diewert (1 980a.b) and
Denny (198O) Diewert (1980a) discusses a broad range of index number methods
applied to the aggregation of capital, including hedonic methods (pp. 503-506);
16 In the first year that a new model appears, it is excluded fromany price
index constructed between that year and the previous one.In the second year,
the model is incorporated into the year-to-year price index, and the cumulative
values of the indexes are reported inTable 1. In contrast, the Paasche index is
constructed relative to the 1980 set of models.22
Denny (1980) responds by questioning whether a separability assumption used by
Diewert is realty necessary: and Diewert (1 980b) replies by suggesting several
approaches that do not require this assumption.
We have applied our results to evaluate the welfare impact of the quality
upgrading that occurred in U.S. imports of Japanese cars, under the voluntary
export restraint. Under this trade restriction, consumers do not value the
additional characteristics at their former shadow-values, but rather, by a
reduced amount. We find that the deadweight loss of the quality upgrading is
very large: between one—quarter and one—third of the value of the upgrading, or
$500 in 1985. This deadweight loss is additional to the losses that result from
transferring the quota rents to Japanese firms (about $1.00 per car in 1984-85,
from Feenstra, 1988). and also the conventional deadweight loss from reducing
the total purchases of cars. Quantifying the loss due to quality upgrading
illustrates the usefulness of having a welfare interpretation for hedonic price
indexes, and we expect that this interpretation will be useful in other
applications, as well.REFERENCES
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24Table 1 - Price Indexes for Sample of Japanese Cars
1980 1981 1982 1q83 1984 1985
Number of Models 24 24 24 26 29 31
Unit_Valuea ($) 5,175 6.211 6.834 7,069 7.518 8,153
(percent change) (4.6)(20.0)(10.0) (3.4) (6.4) (8.4)
Price Indexa 100.0 11 g.8 129.1 131.6 138.8 149.0
(percent change) (3.2)(19.8) (7.8) (1.9) (5.5) (7.4)
Unit-Quality5 ($) 5.147 5.536 5.923 6,287 6,518 6.755
(percent change) (2.4) (7.6) (7.0) (6.1) (3.7) (3.6)
Quality Index5 100.0 107.4 112.8 117.4 121.3 125.8
(percent change) (1.3) (7.4) (5.0) (4.1) (3.4) (3.7)
Price/Quality Ratiob 100.0 111 .5 114.5 11 2.1 114.4 118.4
(percent change) (1.9)(11.5) (2.7)(-2.1) (2.1) (3.5)
Exact Index. Lower BndC 100.0 112.5 115.9 113.7 116.9 121.1
(percent change) (1.5) (12.5) (3.0) (-1.9) (2.8) (3.5)
Exact Index, Upper Bndc 100.0 113.0 116.6 114.6 117.8 121.7
(percent change) (1.5) (13.0) (3.2) (-1.7) (2.8) (3.3)
Paasche Indexd 100.0 111.4 113.0 109.4 111.1 114.1
(percent change) (3.0) (11.4) (1.4) (-3.2) (1.6) (2.7)
Deadweight LOsSd (Xi - 0.9-1.33.7-4.2 3.3-4.04.5-5.1 5.9-6.4
(percentof upgrading)e- (17.6) (34.8) (22.6)(26.3) (31.2)
Notes
a Revised from Feenstra (1988).
b Equals the price index divided by the quality index, multiplied by 100.
c Calculated as in Proposition 1.
d Calculated as in Proposition 2.
e Equals the average of the range in the row just above, multiplied bythe unit-
valuefor that year. divided by the increase in the unit-quality since 1980.
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Thefirst column of Table 1 reports the estimated regression (16) from
Feenstra (1988).Itis difficult to separately estimatethe parameters oi and
thequota premiums st. since they are both parameters of year dummies. This
problem was resolved in Feenstra (1988) by pooling the Japanese auto data for
(17) with Japanese truck data, where the U.S. imports of Japanese trucks are
subject to a tariff but not the quota.In this pooling, the cars and trucks are
treatedas having different vectors of characteristics, and thereis no quota
premiumon trucks. In addition, a relation between the parameters ci forcars
andtrucks, stating that these annual changes in prices are identical after
correctingfor the ad va!orem tariff in trucks and the VER in cars, was tested
andaccepted for 1 980-84. This constraint is imposed in the estimates reported.
In column two we report estimates of (16) for 198S only, utilizing the
estimates of the markups i1 from Feenstra and Levinsohn (1991). In that
gear, the quota premium s95 is insignificantly different than zero incolumnone,
and is set equal to zero. Assuming a log—linear form for the marginal costs, we
estimate the following relations
ln((1 — .i85)Pi851 85 z8s , (Al)
85 'Z185 , (42)
where the markups 1i85 are incorporated into the first relation, but not the
second. The estimates for (Al) are reported in column two, and that for (A2) in
columnthree.It is apparent that the change in the coefficients due to the
change in the dependent variable is not large, as compared to their standard
errors. Thus, the potential bias due to using price rather than marginal revenue
asthe dependent variable in (16) is not important in these estimates.
27Table Al - Hedonic Regressions
Dependent Variable Price Marginal Revenue Price
Years. Obs. 1 979-85. 179 1 985, 25 1 985, 25
S2 0.92 0.92 0.95
Weight (tons) 0.002 0.52 0.23
(0.1 08) (0.46) (0.36)
Width (leet) 0.35w 0.80 0.66
(0.097) (0.32) (0.25)
Height (feet) -0.l6 -0.26 -0.21
(0.057) (0.19) (0.15)
Horsepower (100) 0.70w 0.22 0.40
(0.072) (0.25) (0.19)
Transmission 0.1 6 0.15 0.19
(5-speed or auto) (0.086) (0.069) (0.021)
Power Steering 0.073 0.062 0.089
(0.025) (0.071) (0.055)





Year 1981 0.049 434 - -
(0.040) (250)
Year 1982 0.045 707k - -
(0.041) (256)
Year 1983 -0.024 1085 - -
(0.044) (262)
Year 1984 0.016 1096 - -
(0.044) (267)
Year 1985 0.169 256 - -
(0.069) (492)
Notes
Significant at the 95% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Estimates in column one are from Feenstra (1988).
28